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Meaning is important in everyday life, and each science focuses on certain ways in which reality is 
meaningful. This article (the second of two) discusses practical implications of Herman Dooyeweerd’s 
understanding of meaning for everyday experience, scientific theories, scientific methodology, and 
philosophical underpinning. It uses eight themes related to meaning in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, which 
are discussed philosophically in the first article (and summarised here). This article ends with a case study 
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Meaning is very important in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, yet Reformational philosophy has seldom 
discussed it, and even Dooyeweerd did not clearly elaborate what meaning means. He used the terms 
meaning, meaningful, etc., 3,077 times in his A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Dooyeweerd 1984).  
The reason we are exploring Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning is because we have found it 
extremely useful in fields in which we work—information systems, business, environmental 
sustainability, theology, and computer science. The companion paper (Basden 2019a) discusses how 
Dooyeweerd understood meaning—not only what he wrote about it but also how he used the concept. This 
paper discusses the usefulness or implications of Dooyeweerd’s understanding in everyday life, in the 
sciences, and in philosophy.  
A summary of the companion paper is given in section 2; readers are referred to that paper for 
deeper explanation and discussion. Section 2 also differentiates five ways in which we use the word 
meaning. Section 3 discusses some implications of Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning for everyday 
life, including that of professional life and the academic life of scientists, researchers, and philosophers. 
Section 4 discusses some implications for scientific theory, and section 5, for scientific methodology. 
 
Section 6 discusses some implications for philosophy and for philosophical underpinnings of science. 
Section 7 presents a case study that demonstrates how elements of Dooyeweerd’s understanding of 
meaning may be used together to address the problem of paradigms.  
This article is intended to be of interest to practitioners and scientific researchers as well as 
Reformational philosophers. Science, here, includes social, mathematical, and design sciences, the 
humanities, and natural sciences.  
 
 
2 Meaning as Reality 
 
This section summarises the discussion in Basden (2019a) in sufficient detail for this article. Dooyeweerd 
(1999, appendix) saw meaning as almost a synonym for reality. All reality is meaningful, whether of 
interest to humans or not. Van der Hoeven (1978) suggests that what Dooyeweerd meant by meaning was 
its “ordinary” sense, as used in everyday experience, more than its semantic sense, as used in 
philosophical literature.  
Basden (2019a) finds it useful to differentiate at least five distinct senses of meaning:  
 
• Signification-meanings of words, utterances, diagrams, etc. 
• Interpretation-meanings—e.g., of scattered feathers interpreted as bird kill. 
• Attribution-meanings—e.g., my grandmother’s vase has special meaning for me. 
• Life-meaning, the meaning of life, career, etc. 
• Meaningfulness of all, whether human or non-human, which transcends the other four.  
 
Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning covers all of these senses, but most of his 3,000 uses of the word 
meaning refer to meaningfulness. This article usually employs the word meaning to refer to all of them 
undifferentiated (and also in quoted text), but uses meaningfulness or one of the other terms where we can 
be more specific.  
Basden (2019a) discusses how Dooyeweerd employed meaning(fulness) throughout his 
philosophy, covering eight main themes of Dooyeweerd’s understanding, summarised as follows.  
(1) Meaning is related to everyday experience and the pre-theoretical attitude of thought. 
Dooyeweerd believed that meaning(fulness) is constitutive of everyday reality and experience (cf. the 
phenomenological notion of lifeworld). It is first from everyday, pre-theoretical experience that we begin 
to know and understand meaning.  
(2) Meaning is diverse and coherent. In the pre-theoretical attitude, we experience diversity and 
coherence of meaningfulness. Whereas most theoretical thought tries to reduce diversity (see Basden 
2019a), Dooyeweerd respects diversity. Yet he does so critically, always taking account of coherence of 
meaning. Meaningfulness has irreducibly distinct modalities (aspects, spheres), yet these cohere, in that 
each aspect (i) depends on others, (ii) contains analogical echoes of others, and (iii) never works against 
others. Aspects inherently antecipate and retrocipate each other.  
(3) Meaning has the character of referring and expressing, and implies dependency on an origin 
of meaning (Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:4). All temporal reality refers to (depends on) aspects, which refer to 
each other, and all refer to, and depend on, a transcendent, divine origin of meaning(fulness).  
(4) Being is grounded in meaningfulness. “Meaning is the being of all that has been created,” 
wrote Dooyeweerd (ibid.), “and the nature even of our selfhood.” Being is not constituted in essence nor 
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process nor being-in-world, but in meaningfulness: all being is “being-as”—i.e., mode of being. Being is 
multi-aspectual—the profile of aspects that Dooyeweerd called a structure of individuality is a meaning-
oriented way of understanding types.  
(5) Meaning links with law, functioning, and good. Meaningfulness implies good, each aspect 
defining a distinct kind of good (a way in which reality works well) and, in most aspects, a corresponding 
evil. Meaningfulness as good implies law; the coherence of meaningfulness is a law-side. Law is that 
manifestation of meaningfulness which makes functioning possible (Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:102–106), each 
aspect thereof offering distinct kinds of possibility (e.g., physical, technical, economic possibilities). 
Actualization of each kind of possibility occurs as reality functions in each aspect; this is Dooyeweerd’s 
subject-side. All activity involves multi-aspectual functioning simultaneously. Thus, normativity and 
functioning, like being, arise ontically from diverse meaningfulness; this subverts the conventional 
separation of is from ought. Basden (2019a) suggests a model of meaning in which signification-, 
interpretation-, attribution-, and life-meanings all arise from meaningfulness, as we function in certain 
aspects.  
(6) Meaningfulness surrounds, and pervades all that is and occurs. While meanings are generated 
by subjects, meaningfulness is not generated, nor is it an external causa finalis (Aristotle), nor an initial 
impetus (Bergson). Meaningfulness is a priori and it surrounds and pervades us and all temporal reality 
(subject-side). It is like an “ocean of meaningfulness” in which we exist and “swim” (cf. “dwell” in 
Polanyi and Prosch [1975]). Hence our deepest grasp of meaningfulness is intuitive, from functioning in 
each aspect. The metaphor of an ocean of meaningfulness, though not found in Dooyeweerd, has been 
found useful by some readers and is used below.  
(7) Meaningfulness plays three roles in theoretical thought. Basden (2019a) reinterprets 
Dooyeweerd’s second transcendental critique of theoretical thought (Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:34–68), to 
argue that meaningfulness plays a different role in each of his three transcendental problems. (a) 
Theoretical thought is directed towards an aspect (sphere of meaningfulness) of the world to abstract data. 
(b) The operation of theoretical thought requires that the coherence of meaningfulness, which is split into 
aspects during abstraction, be respected. The meaningfulness of each aspect is usually manifested in an 
irreducibly distinct rationality yet, since there is no single overriding rationality, human responsibility for 
harmonising rationalities is paramount. (c)  All self-critique, important in theoretical thought, must refer 
ultimately to what is presupposed by the thinking community as an origin of meaning. These three (world, 
rationalities, origin of meaning) are different for each philosophy and form its distinct ground-Idea 
(Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:68ff.). Being grounded in prior meaningfulness, theoretical thought can never be 
neutral nor absolute.  
(8) How we may know meaningfulness and its aspects? The challenge to knowing what aspects of 
the ocean of meaningfulness there are is that our very knowing is a multi-aspectual functioning that is 
enabled by the aspects themselves—how can fish understand the ocean? In his general theory of modal 
spheres (Dooyeweerd 1984, vol. 1, part 1), Dooyeweerd addressed this challenge by setting out principles 
for delineating and understanding the kernel meaningfulness of each modality (aspect): begin with 
intuitive grasp of kernels, listen to all thinkers, conceptualise, and test for antinomy. Additional principles 
are suggested in Basden (2019a). A special theory of modal spheres, of which his famous suite of 15 
aspects is an initial but useful outline, is still awaited. Dooyeweerd warned that no suite of aspects, 
including his own, can ever claim completion (Dooyeweerd 1984, 2:556).  
 
Reference will be made back to these themes by number—e.g., (#2), (#4). For fuller explanation 
and discussion, readers should refer to the companion paper (Basden 2019a). The aspects that will be 
referred to in this paper are:  
 
• Quantitative: We and the world exhibit quantity, amount.  
• Spatial: We and the world exhibit continuous extension and simultaneity.  
• Kinematic: We and the world exhibit movement.  
• Physical: We and the world exhibit energy, forces, and causality.  
• Organic/biotic: We and the world exhibit body, life functions, health or disease.  
• Sensitive/psychic: We and the world exhibit sense, feeling, emotion, reactiveness.  
• Analytical: We and the world exhibit conceptual clarity or confusion.  
• Formative: We and the world exhibit shaping, goals, achievements, history, technology, industry or 
laziness.  
• Lingual: We and the world exhibit symbolic signification by which we “parcel up” pieces of 
meaningfulness.  
• Social: We and the world exhibit agreement, togetherness or disagreement.  
• Economic: We and the world exhibit resources, management, frugality or waste.  
• Aesthetic: We and the world exhibit harmony, enjoyment, interest or boredom.  
• Juridical: We and the world exhibit appropriateness, rights and responsibilities, justice or injustice.  
• Ethical: We and the world exhibit attitudes of self-giving love or selfishness.  
• Pistic/faith: We and the world exhibit belief, aspiration, commitment, religion, courage or cowardice.  
 
Humans can function as subjects in all aspects, animals up to the psychic, plants to the organic, and 
material to the physical, but all may function as objects in any aspect (e.g., flowers are beautiful).  
 
 
3 Implications for Everyday Life  
 
This section discusses how Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning and especially meaningfulness can 
be useful in everyday life—first, in general, second, in the everyday activity of professional life, and third, 
in the realities of scientific and philosophical activity. As explained in Basden (2019a), the words 
everyday and pre-theoretical are used almost interchangeably. 
  
3.1 Everyday Life  
Dooyeweerd argued that philosophy based on an immanence standpoint has prevented a truly sensitive 
approach to understanding everyday experience (#1), forcing us instead to take one sphere of meaning as 
our point of reference for all the others (Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:15). The harm is idolatry and/or 
reductionism. Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaningfulness helps us avoid this, can throw light on the 
complexity of everyday reality, and can help guide us in it. His suite of aspects has become a useful tool to 
study everyday experience (Khojah 2018; Aiyenitaju 2018).  
Recent discussion of everyday experience (see section 6) may be assisted by Dooyeweerd’s 
understanding of meaning in three ways. First, Dooyeweerd sees everyday experience as a functioning in 
all aspects simultaneously (#5). This offers a way to navigate its complexity, such as its multiple 
 
normativities (#5), why people adopt multiple roles in everyday life, why artefacts designed for one thing 
can be used otherwise, why people can interpret things differently or attribute different meanings to 
things, and so on. Many examples of these may be found in Basden (2018).  
Second, everyday experience involves intimate (pre-theoretical) engagement with our surrounding 
world which also functions with us in those same aspects (#6) by subject-object and subject-subject 
relationships. Our attitude of thought towards the world is, in the main, pre-theoretical (#1), though it 
might include analytical reflection and what Clouser (2005) calls lower abstraction.  
Third, regarding lifestyle, the ideas that meaning refers beyond (#3) and that aspects are normative 
(#5) imply multi-aspectual responsibility. The metaphorical idea of an ocean of meaningfulness (#6) 
implies that our responsibility extends beyond human beings to all creation. This offers a sound 
philosophical basis for environmental responsibility (Brandon and Lombardi 2005; Basden 2017).  
In professional activity and academic (theoretical) activity there is also everyday life, but it is 
shaped by the aspects that are particularly meaningful in these areas of life—e.g., the economic aspect in 
business dealings, the analytic aspect in science—and these are discussed separately.  
 
3.2 Everyday Experience in Professional Practice  
The everyday life of professional practice is engaged, multi-aspectual functioning, in which some aspects 
are treated as more important than others—the formative, economic, and juridical aspects especially. 
Functioning in these aspects is targeted on aspects that identify the professional practice (e.g., pistic for 
church, biotic for farming, formative for engineering).  
Functioning in each of its aspects (#5) takes on forms peculiar to professional life. Analytical 
functioning is no longer just distinction making but also analysing, formative functioning is not just 
shaping but also planning and designing, lingual functioning comprises report writing and business 
communications, social functioning constitutes professional roles and relationships, and so on up to pistic 
functioning, which is toward formal visions and top-down motivations.  
Sadly often, much of its ethical functioning is devoted, in a self-serving way, to boosting the 
reputation of the organisation, and much of its pistic functioning is hubris and idolatry. These are 
dysfunctions in these aspects which have led to failure of, for example, expensive e-government projects 
(Krishnan-Harihara and Basden 2010). They occur when the organisation (or person, idea, etc.) is treated 
as having meaningfulness in itself. Grounds for ameliorating hubris and idolatry lie in recognising the 
referential, dependent character of meaningfulness (#3).  
A clear awareness of aspects (#2) can be useful in separating out issues or norms and clarifying 
relationships among them. This awareness can be intuitive or theoretical. Intuitive awareness (#6) can be 
helpful in professional discussions. For example, a senior manager once told me how he held the aspects 
at the back of his mind during business discussions, with an eye on which aspects were being discussed 
(e.g., economic) and which were not (e.g., ethical, aesthetic). He could then draw attention to the 
overlooked aspects.  
A more theoretical knowledge of aspect kernels (#8) and their relationship is appropriate in 
analysis, presenting arguments, and planning. Gunton et al. (2017) use it in the ecosystem valuing 
framework, which argues, against the notion of ecosystem services, that all aspects are valuable and 
important, whether they serve human interests or not. Eriksson (2001) employs it to reveal unexpected 
failure in business. Mirijamdotter and Bergvall-Kåreborn (2006) employ it in analysing reasons for the 
1994 Baltic ferry disaster. Lems (2005) uses Dooyeweerd’s aspects as an avenue to water management 
Commented [Nexus 103]: What does “its” refer to? 
 
AB:  To  (the everyday life of) professional practice.  Just as "its" is  
is used at the start of the previous paragraph, and as introduced in 
first paragraph. 
Commented [Nexus 104]: Please retain Capitalization of these 
words. 
Commented [Nexus 105]: Please retain capitalization of these 
words 
 
that takes context into account. Strijbos (2000) argues for the “disclosing” of norms. Finally, techniques 
for aspectual interviewing and analysis have been developed, which will be described later.  
 
3.3 Everyday Experience in Theoretical Life  
Likewise, Dooyeweerd recognised the pre-theoretical (everyday) nature of the activity of science, 
technology, research, and philosophy, which we might call theoretical life.  
Like professional life, the aspects take on a particular profile that differs from ordinary life (#5). 
The analytic functioning of theoretical thinkers goes beyond distinction making, analysis, and lower-level 
abstraction to what Clouser (2005) calls higher abstraction and Dooyeweerd calls theoretical thought 
involving a Gegenstand relationship directed towards aspects of meaningfulness (#7)—see below.  
Theoretical thinking is an "actual activity" (NC,I, 5), involving full human beings functioning in 
all other aspects. A meaningfulness-oriented perspective can throw light on the plethora of claims made 
about it. For example, when Kuhn (1962) argues that science is puzzle-solving, he is drawing attention to 
functioning in the formative aspect. Polanyi and Prosch (1975) draw attention to its aesthetic aspect.  
As in professional life, ethical and pistic functioning too often include dysfunction in serving 
personal and institutional reputation. When theoretical life becomes merely a pastime of the affluent, in 
the face of worldwide poverty and environmental degradation, its juridical aspect becomes dysfunctional 
too.  
Another challenge is fruitless conflicts about what something is. These can sometimes be resolved 
by recognising that the being of the disputed thing derives from meaningfulness (#4) and is multi-
aspectual (i.e., multiple being).  
These and many other practical issues of theoretical thought,  which are made visible by 
Dooyeweerd's understanding of meaning, are discussed more fully in Basden (2019b).  
 
 
4 Implications for Scientific Theories  
 
Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning has implications for the kinds of scientific theories that emerge 
and how they emerge.  
 
4.1 The Role of Meaningfulness in Science  
Dooyeweerd’s clarification of the three roles that meaningfulness plays in theoretical thought (#7) (see 
Basden 2019a) has several implications.  
Aspect of world. One aspect (or a few) defines on what it is relevant to focus (as Gegenstand) in 
studying the world and which data it is meaningful to abstract (e.g., physical for physics, pistic for 
theology). This helps us differentiate areas of interest and research problems within areas. It can make us 
alert to encroachments and reductions, and offers grounds for discussing these. How one field relates to 
others as reference disciplines becomes clearer, especially via the notion of neighbouring aspects (Basden 
2018, 309); we can prepare our field properly to be a reference discipline to others. For instance, the 
information systems field focuses on the lingual aspect, with formative and social neighbouring aspects, 
and is a reference discipline for business.  
Aspectual rationalities. Several rationalities must act in harmony in order to generate new 
knowledge (“findings”). These are expressed in the research methods employed, and knowledge of aspects 
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helps justify appropriate methods. For example, material science must reason about (i) physical laws, (ii) 
mathematical analysis, and (iii) planning of and errors in experiments (formative aspect).  
A practical challenge in theoretical life is category errors (Ryle 1949). These may be detected 
easily and explained lucildly by an educated intuition of aspect kernels, as Dooyeweerd does with Zeno’s 
paradox, since diversity of meaningfulness (#2) is what makes categories possible, and each aspect is 
irreducible to the others. Basden (2018, 67) discusses why it is reasonable to rely on Dooyeweerd’s 
aspects.  
Origin of meaning. Critique and refinement of research findings is carried out with reference to 
meaningfulness.  
Consider the following public discussion of a piece of research:  
 
CRITIC 1: “The author fails to consider X.” (World)  
CRITIC 2: “The author has not analysed correctly, and should employ research method R.” 
(Rationality)  
REJOINDER: “But X is not relevant, because Y. Method R is inappropriate because S.” (On the 
basis of what is meaningful)  
CRITIC 3: “But S/Y is inappropriate in this field, because of P.” (About paradigms)  
REJOINDER: “But P is the current paradigm and is not appropriate; what is being suggested is a 
new paradigm Q.” (Paradigm shift)  
CRITIC 4: “ Q must be resisted/welcomed because of O.” (Origin of meaningfulness)  
 
Initially, critique refers to aspects of world and rationalities, but deeper critique refers to what the 
community takes as more widely meaningful, and ultimately to a religously presupposed origin of 
meaningfulness. We will discuss paradigms later.  
 
4.2 The Interest of Each Science or Discipline  
If we differentiate sciences by their central aspect of focus (aspect of world, #7), this gives each science a 
mandate to open up our theoretical understanding of that aspect and its laws. Table 1 shows some sciences 
for which each aspect is meaningful and some typical research methods, which seem to align with 
aspectual rationality.  
 
[INSERT table 1 here with the following caption:] 
TABLE 1 Sciences per aspect 
 
The irreducibility of aspectual meaningfulness (#2) implies that when a science tries to encroach on other 
areas, or inappropriate research methods are employed, it constrains or misleads the opening up of the 
core aspect. Research becomes less fruitful.  
Crossover sciences like biochemistry or sociolinguistics focus on two aspects of the world, while 
interdisciplinary research and disciplines find even more aspects important. As the contributors to Strijbos 
and Basden (2006) demonstrate, Dooyeweerd’s approach can offer a much-needed, sound philosophical 
basis and practical guidance for full “integrated” interdisciplinarity, which is only rarely achieved. 
Discussion and guidance therein can be enriched by a clear understanding of aspectual irreducibility and 
coherence (dependencies, analogies, and non-conflict) (#2).  
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4.3 Developing Theories in the Sciences  
Scientific theories increase in complexity as they mature, being exposed to, or tested against, reality. This 
complexity may be understood by Dooyeweerd’s suggestion that being, functioning, and normativity all 
have their roots in meaningfulness (#4, #5).  
Here is an example drawn from Basden (2018). Information theory began with a concern for the 
faithful transmission of messages through a noisy medium, and Shannon (1948) reduced this to 
distinguishing intended messages from those corrupted by noise—the analytic aspect. Wiener (1948) saw 
information as a capacity for useful work—the formative aspect. Shannon explicitly excluded semantics 
and the realities of sender and receiver of messages, but the science of hermeneutics is concerned with the 
semantic level of the possibility of misunderstanding, and with human processes of interpretation—the 
lingual aspect. Gadamer (1966, 7) argued that “a common understanding always precedes these situations” 
of communication—the social and lingual aspects. Floridi (2004) remarked that “information is still an 
elusive concept” and that “the philosophy of information (PI) is a new area of research with its own field 
of investigation and methodology.” He devised 18 “open questions” for the philosophy of information, 
which cover the psychic, analytic, and formative aspects, with a little of the lingual. The systems field 
discusses capta, data, information, and knowledge (Checkland and Holwell 1998) in a way that aligns 
these with psychic, analytic, formative, and lingual aspects, and treats each as emerging from the previous 
one by processing. Tuomi (1999) argued that knowledge precedes data (cf. aspectual retrocipation).  
Confusion marks the field. It is clear that many treat information as substance. However, if we 
begin from meaningfulness (#4) and ask which aspects each thinker finds meaningful in the information 
world (#7), as inserted above, we might obtain a comprehensive understanding that embraces all the above 
in one coherent picture (#2).  
Other fields where a Dooyeweerdian approach has brought clarity include statistics (Hartley 
2008), tacit knowledge (Kimani 2017), sustainability (Brandon and Lombardi 2005; Gunton et al. 2017; 
Basden 2017), and technology (Verkerk et al. 2015).  
 
 
5 Implications for Research Methodology  
 
This section discusses how Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning can contribute to (scientific) research 
methodology. Dooyeweerd encourages certain attitudes to research and enriches methods of data 
collection and analysis. In all three, the various elements of Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning have 
several implications.  
In brief, the assumption of this paper is that the main role (meaningfulness) of research as a whole, 
across all sciences, is to build humanity’s bodies of theoretical knowledge. Research contributes findings 
(beliefs about how reality works in selected aspects thereof), which the research community critiques and 
refines until it deems it reasonable to rely on them.  
 
5.1 Attitudes to Scientific Research  
Attitudes to research and beliefs about the role of research, and of the researcher in the research, apply 
throughout the research (including data collection and analysis) and flavour it. This may be understood as 
the retrocipatory effect of ethical and pistic aspects on the other aspects (#2).  
For example, since meaning always refers beyond (#3), research should always be seen in context. 
This is obvious in applied research, but what is the context of pure research? Dooyeweerd’s distinction 
Commented [Nexus 1011]: Please add pagenumber. 
 
The fiirst quotation is page 560, the second is page 554. 
 
between law-side and subject-side (#5) offers insight. In applied research, the context is its subject-side. In 
pure research, the context is the law-side as a coherence of meaningfulness—all the other aspects. So all 
fields should take account of other fields.  
Similarly, because he took the coherence of meaning as a starting point (#2), Dooyeweerd argued 
that the researcher (scientist, philosopher) is no “detached observer” but is always within the world that is 
being researched as engaged, participative thinker. Both world and researcher are surrounded-pervaded by 
the same ocean of meaningfulness (#6). This implies that theoretical thought inherently can never be 
neutral and that research will always be biased. Different kinds of bias arise from the three roles 
meaningfulness plays in theoretical thought (#7): from deeming certain aspects of the world meaningful to 
be abstracted, deeming certain aspectual rationalities to be employed, including sometimes metaphors, and 
deeming certain spheres of meaningfulness valid for critique—and, in all three, bias comes from 
excluding other aspects (spheres). This contrasts with Husserl, who hoped to circumvent bias, and with 
Habermas and Foucault, who, though they accepted bias, believed it to arise from communicative actions 
or a power-knowledge nexus and thus to be largely contingent. Dooyeweerd, in taking the diversity of 
meaningfulness seriously and in delineating its aspects, offers a useful conceptual tool with which to 
investigate and manage some of these kinds of bias and non-neutrality.  
The idea that the same ocean of meaningfulness is prior to all (#6) has several other implications. 
It leads us to dig beneath the surface of published output of research, to understand the deeper 
meaningfulness underneath. For example, Joneidy (2015) used Dooyeweerd’s idea of meaningfulness in 
analysing seminal papers to reveal motivations (see below) so as to critically examine whether they are 
truly seminal and suggest new, fruitful avenues of research.  
This oceanic idea of meaningfulness encourages, and gives a philosophical foundation for, cross-
cultural research. What is said or written (signification-meanings) does not translate well across cultural 
barriers (Blommaert 2005), so misunderstandings might occur; but if both researcher and those being 
researched function within, and are surrounded by, the same spheres of meaningfulness (#6), we may 
expect at least some degree of mutual understanding, especially at the intuitive level at which we grasp 
aspect kernels (#8).  
Now we will discuss how some of these points work out in data collection and analysis.  
 
5.2 Some Implications for Data Collection  
The purpose of interviews, surveys, text analyses, prototypes, observations, experiments, and thought 
experiments is to collect data on what is meaningful in the situations being studied. Several implications 
of Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning have been discussed, especially in relation to interviewing.  
Winfield (2000; see also Winfield, Basden, and Cresswell 1996; Winfield and Basden 2006) 
employed Dooyeweerd’s suite of aspects (#8) in eliciting expertise from experts in various fields ranging 
from veterinary practice to halal food laws, and Kane (2006) employed them to help students speak about 
their aspirations and challenges in learning about information technology. Both used open interviews and 
would begin by presenting the interviewee with a list of Dooyeweerd’s 15 aspects and simple 
explanations. They let the interviewee decide which aspects were meaningful (in their expertise, 
aspirations, or experiences), and the interview proceeded by responding to what the interviewees said and 
delving more deeply. After some time, the interviewer would ask whether there were other aspects that the 
interviewee felt to be important. Kane also invited them to speak about things that did not fit into any 
aspect.  
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The findings of both Winfield and Kane about using Dooyeweerd’s aspects are very interesting; 
they address several well-known challenges to the interview process. The risk of overlooking much that is 
relevant may be reduced by freeing interviewees to speak about all aspects of their everyday activity (#1). 
The challenge of uncovering what is meaningful, which is often hidden behind, and sometimes masked 
by, what is said, is addressed by focusing interviewees on meaningfulness rather than on signification-
meanings (#5). Both Winfield and Kane found that interviewees can readily understand Dooyeweerd’s 
aspects directly, as long as an intuitive rather than strictly conceptual approach is taken (#6, #8). They also 
found that interviewees tended to cover nearly all aspects before they finished (#2); and it was very rare 
for interviewees to mention issues not fitting any aspects. Thus, researcher bias towards certain aspects 
was lessened. Aspects helped both interviewer and interviewee to dig deeper. Winfield observed that 
using the aspects was effective and efficient in eliciting tacit knowledge. Kane noted that using the aspects 
freed interviewees to mention things they assumed were trivial or embarrassing. Perceived or actual power 
imbalance or class barriers often restrict what interviewees say (Mellor et al. 2014); but with aspects, 
meaningfulness is treated as shared equally by interviewer and interviewee (#6). The interviewer-
interviewee relationship becomes closer and trust increases.  
There has been little discussion on how Dooyeweerd’s ideas relate to collecting data in the natural 
or mathematical sciences, which are not about human situations, and the data of which are not couched in 
what people say. Nevertheless, similar challenges remain, often unrecognised, taking different forms. 
Which kinds of data are collected depends on which aspects of the world are deemed relevant. Frequently, 
confusion reigns, which might be ameliorated by understanding Dooyeweerd’s aspects (#8). For example, 
we might expect quantum theory to centre on the physical aspect, but much of it makes no reference to 
energy or causality and is meaningful in the spatial and kinematic aspects. Moreover, some quantum 
theorists talk of “information,” too readily importing meaningfulness of concepts from the lingual aspect 
when they should be referring to a physical analogy of the lingual. Furthermore, the multi-aspectual 
functioning (#5) of quantum researchers affects the theories they develop—Bohr, for instance, was a 
“dilettante” who disliked mathematization of physics (Fruppier 2011, 535; that kind of dislike is)belief: 
pistic functioning.  
These examples are discussed more fully in Basden (2019b). Whatever the source of data, 
Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning can bring clarity and offer new methods; however, much has yet 
to be explored.  
 
5.3 Some Implications for Analysis  
Analysis (by scientists or philosophers) interprets the collected data to generate new knowledge. Analysis 
is guided by two of the three roles meaningfulness plays in theoretical thought—rationalities and origin of 
meaning (#7). Reformational researchers have developed analytical approaches based on Dooyeweerd’s 
understanding of meaning.  
Goede and Basden (2016) propose that Dooyeweerd’s aspects (#2, #8) may be used to 
operationalise Strijbos’s (2000) idea of normative disclosure.  
Practical analysis methods have also been developed. Ahmad (2013; see also Ahmad and Basden 
2013) suggests a technique using Dooyeweerd’s aspects to analyse interview data to find the “down-to-
earth” issues around use of information systems in organisations. Down-to-earth issues are issues that are 
meaningful in everyday activity (#1), contrasting with “high-level” issues like cost, power, or technical 
sophistication, which are of interest to management, academics, or information technology suppliers. 
Khojah (2018) and Aiyenitaju (2018) have developed this to find down-to-earth issues in the use of 
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medical records in hospitals, and in the use of information technology by primary school teachers. Unlike 
Winfield and Kane, Ahmad, Khojah, and Aiyenitaju did not use aspects during interviews but employed 
aspects to analyse interview transcripts. Relevant excerpts from transcripts were analysed by considering 
which aspects make the excerpts meaningful, taking into account, not only the semantics of words, but 
also the pragmatics of why utterances occurred (#5). As examples, Table 2 shows two excerpts from 
Ahmad (2013) along with her aspectual interpretations.  
 
[INSERT table 2 here with the following caption:] 
TABLE 2 Example of interview transcript analysis using aspects 
 
Some aspectual issues are explicit (ex) in the text in table 2, and some are deduced (de)—for example, 
juridical responsibility and pistic commitment. Such deductions can be valid, as not merely products of the 
analyst, when they are made by reference to aspects of prior surrounding meaningfulness (#6) rather than 
to interpretation-meanings by the analyst.  
The use of aspects in analysis helps in several ways. It helps to clarify what makes each utterance 
of the interviewee meaningful and stimulates thinking more deeply about it. It draws attention to 
meaningful issues that might ordinarily be overlooked (#6). It allows reasonable deductions to be made 
that do not depend on the analyst having experience of the situation. Aspects can help classify diverse 
issues (#2). Thus, some forms of researcher bias are reduced.  
A similar approach may be used in analysing texts, such as from papers. Joneidy (2015), Joneidy 
and Basden (2018), and Joneidy and Burke (2018) have been able to reveal hidden motivations of authors 
of seminal papers in two fields; see later.  
Khojah (2018) and Aiyenitaju (2018) take this further with the help of aspects (#8). They 
distinguish issues mentioned in direct answers to interviewer questions from “extra” issues that 
interviewees add voluntarily via stories, opinions, etc. Arguably, these extra issues are more meaningful to 
the interviewees than direct answers, and hence analysis of the extras offers a way to lessen the influence 
that the interviewer has on the interview (another source of researcher bias).  
 
 
6 Implications for Philosophy and Philosophical Underpinnings  
 
Basden (2019a) shows how Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning (especially meaningfulness) 
pervades most, or all, of his philosophy. Therefore, if Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is to engage with 
mainstream philosophies and contribute to them, then his understanding of meaning is likely to be central 
to this engagement. The aim of engaging with mainstream discourses is not to destroy nor to replace, nor 
is it to construct better Christian thought (Klapwijk 1986), but it is to contribute to those discourses 
themselves (Basden 2008) by listening carefully to the discourses that are going on, affirming what is 
good, critiquing underlying presuppositions, and enriching them.  
So, for example, we can appreciate philosophy’s current discourses on everyday experience (#1) 
by American pragmatism, Husserl, Bergson, Heidegger, Bourdieu, de Certeau, etc., after centuries of 
denigrating it. We could question the appropriateness of taking philosophical thought as a starting point 
(#1) with which to understand everyday experience, which most such thinkers do. We can appreciate 
Bourdieu’s (1990) wish to make practice prior to theory (#7), but side with, and enrich, de Certeau’s 
(1984) criticism that he does not in fact achieve this. We could point out how most thinkers have tended 
 
inexorably towards seeing everyday life through the lens of just one of its aspects—the formative in 
pragmatism, the organic in Bergson, the social in Husserl, the juridical in Foucault, the lingual in 
Bourdieu, and the aesthetic in de Certeau—thus not doing justice to the diversity and coherence of 
everyday experience (#2). We could then offer Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaningfulness as 
surrounding us (#6), his idea that everything we encounter in everyday experience is rooted in 
meaningfulness (#4, #5), his transcendental critique of theoretical thought as deriving from everyday 
experience (#7), and his principles for understanding that which surrounds us (#8).  
In similar vein, we could engage with other philosophical discourses, such as on identity, 
including multiple identities, with Dooyeweerd’s understanding of being (#4), good and evil with 
reference to meaningfulness (#5), ontologies (#8), and indeed on meaning itself, which the model of 
meaning proposed in Basden (2019a) (#5), and so on. There is considerable opportunity for Reformational 
philosophers to engage positively with mainstream discourses by employing Dooyeweerd’s understanding 
of meaning(fulness).  
Of more interest in this paper, perhaps, are implications of Dooyeweerd’s understanding of 
meaning for philosophical underpinnings of sciences and disciplines. A few examples from various fields 
must suffice.  
The field of statistics, Hartley (2008) has argued, may be understood more clearly if four main 
approaches are understood as emerging from various ground-motives (presupposed origins of meaning: 
#3, #7). Bayesian approaches seem closest to Dooyeweerd’s ideas.  
In the field of environmental planning, which has been dominated by the restrictive notion of 
ecosystem services, Gunton et al.’s (2017) Dooyeweerd-based idea of ecosystem valuing is attracting 
serious interest. It relies on the idea of prior meaningfulness (#6) in that each aspect offers a distinct value 
which pertains even if it does not directly serve human interests.  
In the field of technology, Verkerk et al. (2015) discuss at length how Dooyeweerd’s ideas might 
contribute, along with others, to understanding, teaching, creating, and guiding technology and 
technological development.  
An example of the potential usefulness of the idea of prior, surrounding-pervading meaningfulness 
(#6) may be found in the fields of ecological psychology, human-computer interaction, and information 
systems. The notion of affordance, pioneered by Gibson (1979), accounts for what an object affords a 
sentient being, such as an animal climbing a rock, a person using a computing device, or a company 
employing information systems. Affordance raises philosophical conundrums: a property that is 
meaningful to the subject is located in the object and does not depend on there being a subject; how can 
this be? The rock exhibits the sentient property of climbability (Gibson 1979), while the computer affords 
mass collaboration (Zammuto et al. 2007). Descartes, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty can address some of 
the issues but none of them can address all. Dooyeweerd can. His understanding of a prior, surrounding 
ocean of meaningfulness (#6) explicitly allows object functioning in later aspects which are meaningful to 
the subject. His suite of aspects additionally offers a way to categorise affordances between and within 
fields (see Basden [2018, 230–232, 238–243] for a full discussion).  
In fact, Basden (2018) offers a number of new frameworks for understanding, based on 
Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning, within five major areas of the field of information systems, 
which ranges across the technical, cognitive, and social sciences. They include the following, with 
indications of which themes are employed:  
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• A new understanding of technology and its role, which incorporates but also extends some insights of 
Heidegger (#3, #6). 
• A new understanding of information (see above) and of computers (#4).  
• Computer programs as virtual law-sides and as performance art (#5).  
• A fresh understanding of artificial intelligence, which might bring fruitful outcomes to the debate on 
the differences and similarities between humans and computers (#7, #5, #2).  
• A more comprehensive understanding of the use of computers and information and communications 
technology as three intertwined multi-aspectual engagements (with technology, with meaningful 
content, and in life), which integrates nearly 20 disparate discourses that are isolated from each other 
(#1, #2, #5). 
• A new understanding of technological features and their design in which a Dooyeweerdian 
understanding of meaningfulness allows the theory of affordance to be integrated with normative 
theories of appropriateness, both being multi-aspectual (#6, #5, #2, #1). 
• A view of information systems development, not as mere processes or people to manage, but as four 
interlocking responsibilities, in each of which every aspect is important (#5, #1, #2). 
• An understanding of the widespread impact of information technology as amplified repercussions and 
normativity in each aspect (which can tackle surveillance, addiction, and climate change) (#5, #2, #7, 
#8).  
• An understanding of the interaction between information technology and society as two Umwelten 
that are qualified by different aspects and which affect each other in a multi-aspectual inter-Umwelt 
relationship (#3, #4, #2). 
• An understanding of the role of the information systems field in terms of meaningfulness—as mandate 
with dignity, destiny, and responsibility given by the lingual aspect (#2, #6).  
 
Some of these frameworks draw on the work of others who have used Dooyeweerd, such as Schuurman 
(1980), while others are new. Some required a rethink of traditional interpretations of Dooyeweerd’s 
ideas. Readers are referred to Basden (2018) for full accounts of each.  
Basden’s approach comes across as rather piecemeal and, in attempting to cover such a wide field 
in one volume, it cannot always provide depth. Basden does admit this, however: many of his ideas are 
initial suggestions, and, calling on others to develop them, he offers over 100 suggestions for specific 
research projects that arise from the frameworks.  
A more integrative, extensive, and deeper application of Dooyeweerd’s ideas has been undertaken 
by Chaplin (2011). Chaplin focuses on the single issue of social structures, especially the state. In 
everyday experience we encounter organised communities as exhibiting an internal unity. Chaplin shows 
how Dooyeweerd accounts for this, in terms of neither substance nor aggregations of individual 
functioning, but in terms of individuality structures. This “not only successfully avoids the pitfalls of both 
(methodological and ontological) individualism and collectivism” but also links “normative design of 
social structures” very closely with the functioning of their members (Chaplin 2011, 105). Chaplin offers 
very useful discussions on the state, business, etc., which make important contributions in several fields.  
Unfortunately, Dooyeweerd saw individuality structures as invariant laws, given by the creator. 
Since it seems untenable to demand that all social structures are invariant, Chaplin offers a reformulation, 
suggesting that “the term invariant structural law could then be dispensed with and replaced with a notion 
of normative imperatives grounded in and directed to this given, stable, but dynamically unfolding, 
created structure of the human person” (Chaplin 2011, 106).  
 
But how may we understand the stability and dynamic-unfoldingness of this “structure of the 
human person”? Chaplin does not say. Fortunately, Dooyeweerd has answered this question in saying that 
meaning(fulness) is the being of all, including the human selfhood (Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:4). Basden 
(2019a) explains how meaningfulness defines good (Chaplin’s normative imperatives) and, in its guise as 
law, enables dynamism (#4, #5). It is the modalities of meaningfulness (aspects) that are most deeply 
invariant, and it is these on which individuality structures depend (as profiles of aspects). Might it be 
useful to define two types of individuality structures—deeper ones that are profiles of meaningfulness, and 
dynamic ones that are profiles of attribution-meanings? This might account for some of the types of social 
institutions that cannot be treated as invariant.  
 
 
7 Case Study: Understanding Paradigms  
 
Whereas sundry individual implications of elements of Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning(fulness) 
have been presented above, the following case study illustrates how all elements may be employed 
together to bring fresh insights into an ongoing discourse. This is an initial proposal, to be developed 
further.  
The popularity of the term paradigm originates with Kuhn’s ([1962] 1996) ground-breaking book 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Though influential in the philosophy of science, and intellectual 
life more generally, considerable confusion remains, which Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning 
might alleviate.  
 
7.1 The Idea of A Paradigm  
Kuhn proposed that science progresses not only through gradual growth of knowledge (which he called 
normal science), but also through scientific revolutions, in which one paradigm displaces another—for 
example, the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics. A paradigm is a consensus among practising 
scientists about solutions to central problems of their field, often couched as exemplars. A new paradigm 
allows new research questions to emerge and new theories to be generated. Though Kuhn discusssed 
fields in the natural sciences, we can find the impact of Kuhn’s work in many fields (Hollinger 1973), 
including sociology (Burrell and Morgan 1979).  
Commitment to a paradigm is derived from scientists’ training and values, not from critical 
testing. Normal science operates under the guidance of a dominant paradigm until scientists reach a point 
of chaos. Then a revolutionary switch to a new paradigm occurs. Paradigm shifts do not occur on the basis 
of reason alone.  
Despite its wide use, the idea of paradigm has caused considerable difficulty in the philosophy of 
science, some arguing, for example, that Burrell and Morgan misunderstood Kuhn. Kuhn himself changed 
his views in response to criticism. A discussion of Kuhn’s ideas by Popper, Lakatos, Feyerabend, 
Masterman, and others is collected in Lakatos and Musgrave (1970). Kuhn’s paradigms resemble Lakatos’ 
research programmes, in which a core set of beliefs and assumptions is retained (and protected by tacit 
agreement), and Feyerabend’s worldviews, which he defines as “a collection of beliefs, attitudes, and 
assumptions that involves the whole person, not only the intellect, has some kind of coherence and 
universality, and imposes itself with a power far greater than the power of facts and fact-related theories” 
(Feyerabend 1994  152)).  
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Masterman argues that Kuhn’s notion of paradigm is ambiguous and confusing, finding 21 
different ways in which Kuhn used the term paradigm. “Given the diversity of conceptions of paradigm,” 
Masterman (1970, 65) asks, “is there anything in common between all these conceptions?”  
 
7.2 Paradigms as Meaningfulness  
Might the challenges to the Kuhnian idea be addressed using Dooyeweerd’s understanding of 
meaning(fulness)? We can see similarities with Dooyeweerd’s view that theoretical thought involves the 
whole person, is non-neutral, and expresses diversity and coherence of meaning (Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:3–
5).  
The proposal here is that paradigms are defined by meaningfulness. Paradigms express what it is 
meaningful for scientists to consider and do, and how the community should critique ideas (the three roles 
meaningfulness plays in theoretical thought—#7). The feeling of difference between paradigms may be 
accounted for by reference to their finding different aspects meaningful, which are irreducibly distinct in 
their meaningfulness and laws. For example, Einsteinian mechanics may be distinguished from Newtonian 
by taking better account of the kinematic aspect. Operating within a chosen or assumed paradigm is a 
pistic commitment to that paradigm.  
The prior surroundingness of meaningfulness (#6) implies that a new paradigm expresses an 
aspect of its diversity (#2) that had previously been overlooked in the dominant paradigm. The chaos felt 
under the dominant paradigm emerges from real functioning in overlooked aspects that could not be 
explained.  
 
7.3 The Meanings of Paradigm 
If a paradigm governs what its thinkers find meaningful, then the 21 uses of the paradigm concept found 
by Masterman (1970) may be seen as expressing either various elements of its meaningfulness, or the 
complexity of the multi-aspectual, everyday activity (#1) that is operating within the paradigm. Table 3 
shows how each of the 21 uses may be understood either as an expression of an element of Dooyeweerd’s 
understanding of meaning (column 3) or as an aspect of the functioning that is operating within a 
paradigm (column 4). 
  
[INSERT table 3 here with the following caption:] 
TABLE 3 Dooyeweerdian understanding of 21 uses of paradigm 
 
Thus, Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning might integrate most of these uses of the word paradigm.  
So we see that several parts of Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning might enable us to offer 
both a clear (yet not oversimplified) and rich (yet manageable) understanding of paradigms, both as 
governing scientific activity in a field and as within a wider context. It promises to be applicable to many 
kinds of science, including the social sciences.  
A fuller, though earlier, discussion of paradigms in the information systems field may be found in 
Joneidy (2015).  
 
7.4 Discourses and Perspectives  
We may go further. If paradigms are centred on meaningfulness, then we should be able to understand 
how they link with other things that arise directly from meaningfulness, including perspectives and 
discourses.  
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At the macrolevel, we may see things like Taylorism in business as a paradigm that restricts what 
is meaningful, specifically resources (economic aspect) and control (formative aspect), and a 
Dooyeweerdian approach can help escape this in several ways. It can explain the paradigm’s limitations in 
terms of aspects that are deliberately ignored. It can explain the anti-Taylorist reactions that have 
occurred, as emphasising some of these ignored aspects. It can offer normative guidance on how business 
may operate, from the norms of all aspects. Likewise, feminism may be understood as a genuine attempt 
to call humanity’s attention to overlooked aspects. For example, Adam (1998) argues that, traditionally, 
what we call the masculine aspects (analytic, formative, economic, and juridical) have been emphasised at 
the expense of other important aspects of life, to which feminism now draws our attention: the biotic, 
social, aesthetic, and ethical aspects.  
At the microlevel, we may use Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning(fulness) to study 
discourses that arise in a field; for example, medical records (Joneidy and Burke 2018) and information 
systems (Joneidy and Basden 2018). These studies propose that discourses in a field arise, as do 
paradigms, because a group of people find certain things meaningful, and this meaningfulness is expressed 
via the signfification-meanings of what is discussed. The importance (meaningfulness) of each discourse 
may be explained by its revolving around a core aspect (or unique pairing of aspects, in the latter study), 
which may be identified by a systematic aspectual analysis of seminal papers. When two discourses 
revolve around the same aspect, they often feel akin and often refer to each other. For instance, in 
information systems, six discourses are identified: prediction of acceptance (quantitative-economic), 
multi-dimensionality (analytical-formative), how people use features (formative-lingual), benefits in use 
(economic-ethical), resistance and non-use (social-juridical), and use in all areas of life (social-aesthetic).  
Approaches to a field may be understood as aspects of (ways of seeing) the field. They sometimes 
arise when the community begins to recognise discourses as addressing different aspects. Earl’s (2001) 
seven approaches to knowledge management in organisations offers an example where each approach may 
be aligned with aspects that make it meaningful, as shown in table 4.  
 
[INSERT table 4 here] 
TABLE 4 Earl’s seven approaches to knowledge management, and the aspects that make them meaningful 
 
Since most approaches clearly align with a single, different aspect, and aspects are fundamentally 
irreducible in meaningfulness, this implies that Earl’s classification might be well founded and robust. 
Classifications where aspects overlap might prove less robust.  
Sometimes approaches are presumed to be mutually incommensurable. Eriksson (2003) argues 
that the presumption of incommensurability between hard, soft, and critical systems thinking arises from 
the ground-motive of nature and freedom. However, Basden (2011) argues that the three equivalent 
approaches in information systems research—positivism, interpretivism, and criticalism—may be 
successfully integrated by thinking in terms of meaningfulness rather than ground-motives. A comparison 
of the ground-Idea components (i.e., world, rationality, and wider meaningfulness; #7) of each approach 
finds different aspects meaningful—hence, they can contribute together to the wider whole that is 
research.  
 
7.5 Conclusion of the Case Study  
This shows briefly how a meaningfulness-oriented approach can help to understand Kuhn’s notion of 
paradigms and to see how paradigms relate to discourses, perspectives, and approaches, and how they 
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This article has reviewed some useful implications, for the sciences and for practice, of Dooyeweerd’s 
understanding of meaning, which is extensively discussed in the companion paper (Basden 2019a). Every 
portion of Dooyeweerd’s understanding has been found useful,  most of which apply across the entire 
range of science—from mathematics and the natural sciences to cognitive, social, and societal sciences. 
The following shows the number of times each element of Dooyeweerd’s understanding of meaning has 
been referred to above as having implications:  
 
(1) Meaning and everyday experience: 10 times.  
(2) Diversity and coherence of meaning, including suite of aspects: 21 times.  
(3) Meaning as referring and dependence: 7 times.  
(4) Being grounded in meaningfulness: 10 times.  
(5) Meaningfulness as good, law; functioning, also model of meaning: 22 times.  
(6) Prior, surrounding-pervading ocean of meaningfulness: 19 times.  
(7) Role of meaningfulness in theoretical thought: 19 times.  
(8) Knowing surrounding meaningfulness and delineating aspects: 11 times.  
 
The relative counts do not matter because the implications discussed above are not an unbiased sample. 
What does matter is that every element has proven to have multiple implications for everyday experience, 
scientific theories, scientific methodology, and philosophy.  
In his foreword to A New Critique, Dooyeweerd (1984, 1:vii) wrote:  
 
I am strongly convinced that for the fruitful working out of this philosophy, in a genuinely 
scientific manner, there is needed a staff of fellow-labourers who would be in a position 
independently to think through its basic ideas in the special scientific fields. 
 
Given the discourses that are developing around meaning in mainstream philosophies and sciences, the 
time might now be right for Dooyeweerd’s ideas to be explored, applied, and recommended in many fields 
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